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THE CONSTITUTION AND STATE POWERS
OF EXPORT LIMITATION

Larry D. Barnett*

Historians of the future are likely to view the decade of the 1970's as
significant at least partially because it was the decade in which Americans underwent a fundamental change in economic philosophy, discarding their long-held belief that unlimited material abundance was possible.
The change resulted from a number of factors, among them the environmental movement that began in the late 1960's' and the Arab oil embargo
of 1973. Another factor was the publication of a number of scientific
studies by well-respected organizations and individuals emphasizing that
the raw materials on which the American industrial economy depended
were indeed insufficient to satisfy past levels of consumption much
longer. For example, in 1973 the Geological Survey of the Department of
the Interior sponsored a study of minerals important to the economy and
their availability from domestic sources. The study concluded that
only a few commodities are readily available to the United
States in quantities adequate to last for hundreds of years. By
no means is it too early to become concerned about future
mineral supplies-and to start planning. [T]he decrease in mineral supplies . . . is placing modem American affluence in

jeopardy. The real extent of our dependence on mineral resources places in jeopardy not merely affluence, but world
civilization. 2
* Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida. J.D., University of Florida; Ph.D., Florida State University; M.S., Oregon State
University; B.S. University of California, Los Angeles.
1. Studies indicate that the intensity of concern with environmental problems was
never great among the American public as a whole. G. GROSSMAN & H. POTTER, A
LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN: EVIDENCE FROM NATIONAL

SURVEYS 10-12 (Working Paper No.142, Institute for the Study of Social Change, Dep't of
Sociology & Anthropology, Purdue Univ. August 1977). However, while the concern was
not generally intense, it apparently was sufficiently pervasive to help counter the traditional belief in the possibility of unlimited growth, particularly when combined with the
occurrence of other events that caused questioning of the belief.
2. Brobst & Pratt, Introduction, in U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, UNITED STATES MINER-
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Evidence of the new economic philosophy appeared in 1977 in a
national survey of public opinion conducted by pollster Louis Harris.
When asked whether they would place greater emphasis upon "teaching
people how to live more with basic essentials" or upon "reaching higher
standards of living," four out of five American adults chose the former.
Similarly, three out of four chose "learning to get our pleasure out of
non-material experiences" over "satisfying our needs for more goods
and services." Two out of three believed that society would be improved
if there were emphasis on "learning to appreciate human values more
than material values" rather than on "finding ways to create more jobs
for producing more goods. "3At least verbally then, Americans appear to
be rejecting the philosophy that resources are limitless and economic
growth is intrinsically desirable.
It is impossible to predict exactly how difficult the actual transition
will be from an economy of relative abundance to an economy of
material limitations. The availability of raw materials depends on many
factors, only one of which is the existence of minerals in the ground.
Energy is one important factor, since it is necessary in both the extraction
and processing of raw materials. As readily-accessible deposits of minerals have been mined, less-accessible deposits have of necessity been
utilized, requiring greater quantities of energy; thus we are now witnessing the energy-expensive development of off-shore oil extraction and
the procurement of oil from land areas distant from population and
industrial centers, e.g., northern Alaska. Moreover, ever-lower grades of
ore are being used to obtain minerals, making the cost and availability of
the necessary amounts of energy probably the single most important
factor determining whether mineral deposits can be mined economically.4 The "energy crunch" which the United States is experiencing is thus
a vital part of the overall problem of mineral availability, and it requires
AL RESOURCES 7 (Geological Survey Paper No. 820, D. Brobst & W. Pratt eds. 1973).
[hereinafter cited as Brobst & Pratt].
Other studies reaching the same general conclusion include COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
AND MAN, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NATONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESOURCES

AND MAN (1969) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES AND MAN]; D.H.
MEADOWS, D.L. MEADOWS, J. PANDERS, & W. BEHRENS, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972)
[hereinafter cited as THE LIMITS TO GROWTH]; COMMITrEE ON MINERAL RESOURCES AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, COMMISSION ON NATURAL RESOURCES, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1975) [hereinafter cited as COMMITrEE ON MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT].

3. WASHINGTON POST, May 23, 1977, at A10, col. 1.
On the basis of his survey, which contained additional sets of statements besides those
presented, Harris concluded that "[t]he American people have begun to show a deep
skepticism about the nation's capacity for unlimited economic growth, and they are wary
of the benefits that growth is supposed to bring." Id.
4. Brobst & Pratt, supra note 2, at 8.
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note of two well-publicized events occurring less than one month apart in
the Spring of 1977. The first was the address of President Carter to a joint
session of Congress on April 20. Labelling the energy crisis "the greatest
domestic challenge that our Nation will face in our lifetime" and warning
that disregard of it "would subject our people to an impending catas-

trophe," the President called for measures to curtail substantially oil

consumption. 5 The second event was the announcement on May 17 of the

results of a two-and-a-half year study of current energy sources sponsored by the Massachusetts Institue of Technology. The thirty-five authors of the study, coming from fifteen nations and from science as well
as industry, concluded unanimously that demand for oil might exceed
supply as early as 1983 and that demand would definitely exceed supply

no later than 1995.6 Oil, which currently accounts for approximately 45
percent of total energy consumption in the United States, 7 will be difficult to obtain in sufficient quantity in less than two decades. The
potential impact on mineral supplies would appear to be substantial.
Further complicating the ability of the American economy to obtain
raw materials in adequate amounts is the continued growth of population
in the United States.' Population growth affects resource availability by
accelerating the depletion of nonrenewable resources while at the same
time increasing the need for them. Since population growth causes
problems of both supply and demand, it is instructive to note the number
by which births exceeded deaths in this country since 1970:
1970

1971

1,810,355

1,628,428

1972

1,294,467

1973

1,163,962

1974

1,225,570

1975

1,251,319

1976 (provisional)

1,253,0009

5. 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 566 (April 25, 1977).
6. N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1977, at 1, col. 3 (city ed).
7. Calculated from BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL

ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1975, at 531 (96th ed. 1975).
8. For an explanation of the apparently widespread misconception that population
growth has stopped in the United States, see Barnett, The Constitutionalityof Selected
Fertility ControlPolicies, 55 N.C. L. REV. 357 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Barnett].
9. Calculated from MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT. Data for 1970 come from 22
id., No. 11 Supp., at 1 (1974) and 22 id., No. 12 Supp., at 1 (1974). Data for 1971 come
from 23 id., No. 3 Supp., at 1 (1974) and 23 id. No. 3 Supp. (3), at 1 (1974). Data for 1972
come from 23 id., No. 8 Supp., at I and 23 id., No. 8 Supp. (2), at 1 (1974). Data for 1973
come from 23 id., No. I1 Supp., at 1 (1975) and 23 id., No. 11 Supp. (2) at 1 (1975). Data
for 1974 come from 24 id., No. 11 Supp., at 1 (1976) and 24 id., No. 11 Supp. 2, at 1 (1976).
Data for 1975 come from 25 id., No. 10 Supp., at 1 (1976) and 25 id., No. 11 Supp., at 1
(1977). Data for 1976 are from 25 id., No. 12 (1977).
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As the figures show, population growth is appreciable, and the excess of
births over deaths has been increasing since 1973.10 Data for 1976
indicate that women 18-24 years of age expect to bear 2.03 children
each," but an immediate halt to population growth requires that these
women have only 1.2 children each.' 2 Measures to motivate Americans
to have fewer children have not concerned political leaders, 13 but as the
director of the United States Geological Survey wrote in his agency's
1973 study:
Our own population, to say nothing of the world's, is already
too large to exist without industrialized, high energy- and
mineral-consuming agriculture, transportation, and manufacturing. If our supply of critical materials is enough to meet our
needs for only a few decades, a mere tapering off in the rate of
increase of their use, or even a modest cutback, would stretch
out these supplies for only a trivial period. If resource adequacy
cannot be assured into the far-distant future, a major reorientation of our philosophy, goals, and way of life will be necessary.
And if we do need to revert to a low resource-consuming
economy, we will have to begin the process as quickly as
possible in order to avoid chaos and catastrophe. 14
Measures designed not merely to halt population growth but to reduce the
size of the population rapidly will thus be necessary, at least if the
general conclusions of the study 15 are accepted. However, even a call for
population stabilization by the end of the century which emanated in
1969 from a committee of the National Academy of Sciences, 16 has gone
unheeded by political leaders.
10. The excess of births over deaths during the first ten months of 1977 is provisionally estimated to be 1,197,000 as compared to 1,040,000 in the same period of 1976. 26 id.,

No. 10, at 1 (1978).
11.

BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REP.,

Series P-20, No. 300, at 2 (1976).
12. Frejka, Reflections on the Demographic Conditions Needed to Establish a U.S.
Stationary PopulationGrowth, 22 POPULATION STUDIES 379, 382 (1968).
13. Constitutional measures to control fertility are, however, available. See Barnett,

supra note 8, and Rabin, PopulationControl Through FinancialIncentives, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 1353 (1972).
14. McKelvey, Mineral Resource Estimates and Public Policy, in U.S. DEPT. OF
INTERIOR, UNITED STATES MINERAL RESOURCES, 9, 18 (1973).

15. See text accompanying note 2, supra.
16. COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES AND MAN, supra note 2, at 11. The Committee
concluded that, in order for adequate resources to be available,
population control is the absolute primary essential without which all other
efforts are nullified. Our Department of State and of Health, Education, and
Welfare should adopt the goal of real population control both in North America
and throughout the world. Ultimately, this implies that the community and
society as a whole, and not only the parents, must have a say about the number of
children a couple may have.
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It is impossible to be certain at this point in history whether population size has already exceeded potential mineral supplies or whether
population size is approaching the limit of potential supplies. Regardless
of the viewpoint one adopts, however, a shortage of raw materials seems
inevitable. For even if one accepts the latter, more optimistic view that
population numbers have not yet exceeded potential supplies, it does not
appear that the stringent measures necessary for a rapid curtailment of
fertility will be accepted by political leaders either in the United States or
in the world at large. Seemingly destined to prevail is the traditional
family planning approach which assumes that couples will have the
optimum number of children needed by their society if they are given
information about and access to contraception and abortion.17 While such
an approach may ultimately halt population growth, the magnitude of the
population increase which it permits will create intense competition for
resources worldwide. Assuming a decline in fertility that is more rapid
than is likely to occur, the population of the world will rise from 3.6
billion in 1970 to 5.8 billion in 2000 and 7.9 billion in 2050. This is an
increase of 4.3 billion in just 80 years, and the increase is larger than the
total population of the world in 1970. If replacement-level fertility in
developing countries does not occur by the year 2000, as is assumed by
the preceding projection, but occurs instead by 2040, world population
will jump from 3.6 billion in 1970 to 6.6 billion in 2000 and to 13.0
billion in 2050.18 It does not seem probable that mineral supplies will be
adequate under even the more optimistic projection, especially when one
17. There is evidence that the utilization of birth control methods and the decline in
the rate of population growth in developing and developed societies is primarily due to the
motivation to limit family size rather than the availability of birth control technology.
Blake & Gupta, Reproductive Motivation versus Contraceptive Technology: Is Recent
American Experience an Exception? 1 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 229 (1975); Davis,
Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?, 158 Sci. 730 (1967); cf. "Udry,
Bauman, & Morris, The Effect of Subsidized Family PlanningServices on Reproductive
Behaviorin the United States, 1969-1974, 13 DEMOGRAPHY 463 (1976).
18. COMMITTEE ON MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2, at
286.
"Replacement-level fertility" does not halt population growth immediately in these
projections because of the disproportionately large number of individuals in their childbearing years in most countries of the world. These individuals add to the size of the
population by producing children but do not leave the population because of their
comparatively low death rate. Thus, for example, in the two projections presented,
replacement-level fertility was assumed to exist for the developed countries beginning in
1970, but the population of such countries still increased from 1.1 billion in 1970 to 1.3
billion in 2000 and to 1.4 billion in 2050. id.
While the rate of population growth has declined in the developed regions over the
last two decades, there appears to have been no decline in the developing regions. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, WORLD POPULATION: 1975 at 9 (1976). But see
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, WORLD POPULATION GROWTH AND RESPONSE:
1975 at 265 (1976). [hereinafter cited as POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU]
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keeps in mind that the production of minerals just since the start of World
War II has roughly equalled the total production in the thousands of years
before, 19 and that only some 30 percent of the world's population currently lives in developed countries 20 from which most of the demand for
minerals arises. 21
If there are to be serious shortages of resources in the future, it is
important to begin to identify and evaluate the reactions that may take
place in our legal and social institutions. One such reaction is likely to be
attempts by states to control the shipment of raw materials obtainable
within their borders to other states and to foreign countries in order to
assure sufficient supplies for their own residents. 22 Most proven reserves
of oil are in just two states-Alaska and Texas.23 The primary domestic
source of mercury, which is also expected to be in short supply 24 and for
many uses of which adequate substitutes do not exist, is one stateCalifornia.25 If Alaska, Texas, and California decide to restrict exports of
their minerals, can they do so? It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate
the ability of a state to limit exports under the United States Constitution.
SUBSIDIES FOR SALES TO RESIDENTS

A recent decision by the United States Supreme Court gives support
to the view that a state can establish monetary subsidies for private firms
located within its boundaries which utilize raw materials obtainable
within the state, permitting these firms to pay higher prices and outbid
non-resident competitors for the materials, and that the state can pay a
subsidy to the firms for sales of the materials to residents. Through such a
19. Lovering, MineralsResources from the Land, in COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES AND
MAN, supra note 2, at 120.
20. COMMITTEE ON MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2,

at

286.
21. Among nineteen nonrenewable minerals vital to an industrial economy, the
United States by itself consumes at least 20 percent of the annual world consumption of
almost every one. For example, the proportion of total world consumption for which the
United States is responsible is 40 percent or larger in the case of aluminum, coal, and
molybdenum; 30-39 percent in the case of copper, nickel, petroleum, and the platinum
group; and 20-29 percent in the case of gold, iron, lead, mercury, silver, tin, and zinc. THE
LIMITS TO GROWTH, supra note 2, at 57, 59. The population of the United States constitutes approximately five percent of the total population of the world. Calculated from
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 18, at 266.
22. Van Baalen, Mineral Export Legislation-CanIt Withstand FederalPreemption
and Commerce Clause Challenges?, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 131, 134 (1977).
23. I BUREAU OF MINES, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, MINERALS YEARBOOK: 1973 at 940

(1975).

24. Brobst & Pratt, supra note 2; COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 309, 313 (fifth annual report, 1974).

25. Bailey, Clark & Smith, Mercury, in U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, supra note 2, at 402,
403.
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program of subsidies, a state can influence market forces in such a way as
to promote the retention of raw materials for its own population.
The decision upon which this conclusion is based is Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corporation,26which involved an attempt by the State
of Maryland to reduce the number of abandoned automobiles cluttering
its landscape. Subsidies were established for scrap metal processors for
each old and inoperable abandoned automobile (termed a "hulk") that
they scrapped. The subsidies received by the processors were shared with
the suppliers of the automobiles; in the case of wreckers which supplied
automobiles and which were residents of and licensed by the state, the
statute required sharing. In the case of unlicensed suppliers, the subsidies
were of necessity shared in the form of higher purchase prices in order to
promote the flow of automobile hulks for scrapping. However, to receive
the subsidy, the processor had to furnish the state with evidence of title to
the automobile. Scrap processors were not required to be residents of
Maryland, but if they were not, the documentation needed for the subsidy
was considerably more difficult to obtain for hulks from unlicensed
suppliers. "The practical effect of the [subsidy program] .

.was to

limit the enhanced price available to unlicensed suppliers to hulks that
stayed inside Maryland, thus discouraging such suppliers from taking
their hulks out of State for processing. The result was that the movement
of hulks in interstate commerce was reduced.' '7 Appellee, a Virginia
scrap processor, challenged the distinction made between resident and
nonresident processors because of the deleterious impact on the number
of automobiles it received from Maryland. The Court rejected the challenge, holding that the subsidy program did not violate either the
commerce clause, which gives to Congress the authority to regulate
interstate (and foreign) commerce, 28 or the equal protection clause,
which prohibits a state from denying a person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.29
With regard to the commerce clause, the appellee argued that the
subsidy program was a substantial burden on interstate commerce in that
it reduced the flow of hulks across state lines. However, Hughes differed
from prior situations faced by the Court, because Maryland did not
prohibit automobile hulks from moving to other states, and it did not
regulate the conditions under which hulks could be removed from the
26.
27.
28.
29.

426 U.S. 794 (1976).
Id.at 803.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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state.3° Consequently, the Court held, the subsidy program did not run
afoul of the commerce clause:
[The effect upon the flow of hulks resting within the State is
[that]. . . they will tend to be processed inside the State rather
than flowing to foreign processors. But no trade barrier of the
type forbidden by the Commerce Clause. . . impedes their
movement out of State. They remain within Maryland in response to market forces, including that exerted by money from
the State. Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce
Clause forbids a State, in the absence of congressional action,
from participating in the market 31
and exercising the right to
favor its own citizens over others.
With regard to the equal protection clause, appellee contended that
the classification of resident and nonresident processors did not achieve
the purpose of the subsidy program-namely, removing abandoned automobiles from the state-as effectively as a classification based on the
location of the abandoned hulk. The subsidy, the appellee argued, should
have been made contingent upon proof that the hulk was abandoned in
Maryland, creating a classification of in-state/out-of-state abandonment
that would be more useful in fulfilling the purpose of the subsidy.
The Court admitted that a more effective classification could have
been devised but nonetheless upheld the subsidy program on the ground
that the classification used was reasonably related to the program purpose. The state developed the classification on the assumption that hulks
received by Maryland processors had probably been abandoned in the
state and that hulks received by foreign processors had probably been
abandoned elsewhere. The Court held the assumptions to be reasonable,
even without supporting statistical evidence, and suggested that they
32
could justify totally discontinuing subsidies to out-of-state processors.
The Supreme Court, then, will permit a state to enter the market
with financial incentives that foster the flow of materials to its own
industries. Indirect influences through subsidies are permissible for retaining materials for processing within the state, though mandatory
requirements for such retention are not when the materials are owned by
private individuals or organizations.33 Presumably, a state can also offer
financial incentives to processors and distributors which sell the materials
to its residents. Hughes did not directly deal with this question, but the
30.
31.
32.
33.

426 U.S. at 806.
Id. at 809-10.
Id. at 813, 814.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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conclusion of the Court that a state has the authority to favor its own
citizens in and through a subsidy program is sufficiently general to
encompass a subsidy for sales to resident consumers. Moreover, this
issue is implicit in two cases which upheld state requirements that private
business firms choosing to receive public funds prefer residents over
nonresidents. The decisions support the proposition that a state is free to
utilize its treasury to motivate private enterprise to act in ways which
promote the economic interests of residents at the expense of nonresidents; a subsidy for sales to residents is within this proposition. Let us,
therefore, look more closely at the two cases.
In the first, the State of Florida required that all printing for the state
and its agencies be done in the state. The plaintiff printing company had
no facilities within Florida and was thus refused contracts to print
yearbooks for state universities. It challenged the constitutionality of the
statute and regulations under which the state acted, arguing that they
violated both the commerce clause and the equal protection clause. A
three-judge federal district court rejected the arguments of the plaintiff,
34
and the decision was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court.
On the commerce clause issue, the district court held that the state did not
directly interfere with interstate commerce and that the clause was not
applicable to actions by a state in conducting its own business affairs.
Under the equal protection clause, the court distinguished governmental
from proprietary power. Governmental power is that utilized in governing and regulating the conduct of people, while proprietary power refers
to the means by "which the government acts and contracts for the private
advantage of its constituents and of the government itself." 35 In exercising governmental power, the state must abide by the federal Constitution
as well as its own constitution. In exercising proprietary power, however, the state is no more subject to constitutional restrictions than a
private enterprise. Moreover, when acting in a proprietary capacity,
the state is like a trustee; the citizens are the beneficiaries. It
may be necessary for the state to adopt discriminatory purchasing policies.

. .

to insure that the interest of the people is best

served. In fact it is conceivable that the failure to do so
36 would
constitute a breach of the state's duty to its residents.
There is, then, no denial of equal protection to private parties when the
state discriminates on the basis of residence in the expenditure of funds
34. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 409
U.S. 904 (1972).
35. 339 F. Supp. at 721 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 722, 723.
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under its proprietary power. A state program of subsidies for sales to
residents would seem to be within the proprietary domain inasmuch as
the program is promoting a private benefit for state residents; regulation
of private behavior, which would invoke governmental power, is not its
goal. Accordingly, the subsidy program, being an exercise of proprietary
power, would appear to be constitutional.
The second case, decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, involved
a state statute under which private parties contracting for public works
projects with any state or local governmental entity were required to
employ Illinois residents to the extent they were available. 37 The court
held that the statute did not violate the equal protection clause or the
privileges and immunities clause38 (discussed more fully below) inasmuch as it promoted employment in the state and reduced welfare rolls.
The court further held that the statute met the requirements of the
commerce clause because the state does not burden interstate commerce
by imposing reasonable conditions in contracts it writes with those doing
business with it.
In short, a state may utilize its economic resources to promote the
welfare of its residents, and it may require that business firms prefer
residents over nonresidents in order to receive public funds. It logically
follows that a state can establish subsidies to private organizations as an
incentive for sales to residents.
STATE ORGANIZATIONS AS COMPETITORS WITH PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

A state can go further than providing subsidies to private firms to
promote the sale of needed resources to residents. It can create and
control organizations that will purchase resources and sell them to residents. The state-controlled organizations can compete with private enterprise, which may be taxed for the funds needed to operate such organizations.
In 1920, the Supreme Court faced a challenge to a series of laws
enacted by North Dakota which, among other things, created a home
building association whose purpose was to provide homes for state
residents by purchase, lease, or construction and which authorized bonds
for first mortgage loans on real estate, the state pledging its full faith and
credit for the repayment of the bonds.39 The laws were challenged on the
37.
38.
entitled
39.

Holland v. Bleigh Construction Co., 61 Ill.2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, which provides: "The citizens of each State shall be
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, aff'g 44 N.D. 395, 176 N.W. 11 (1920).
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ground that they promoted a private rather than a public purpose and
therefore violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court accepted the conclusion of the legislature and Supreme Court of North Dakota that the purpose of the measures was public
and upheld the laws, pointing out that there is a strong presumption in
favor of a public purpose in measures exercising the taxing power of the
state. The Court noted that the existence of a public purpose is not
confined to situations where the state is forced to act out of necessity in
order to prevent anarchy or a public health disaster and that the concept
of public purpose extends to the expenditure of funds for projects which
promote the economic prosperity, psychological well-being, and general
welfare of society. n' The provision of housing was clearly within the
boundaries of that definition.
Thus, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the entry of state government into fields where it competes with private enterprise for the purpose
of providing residents with resources important to their welfare, and it
has approved the use of the taxing power in furtherance of the state's
efforts. However, it is not only housing that a state can acquire for, and
sell to, its residents. The City of Portland, Maine established a yard to
sell wood, coal, and fuel to its inhabitants at cost and operated the yard
with revenues raised by taxation. The Supreme Court upheld the action
by the provision of
of the city, saying that a public purpose is served
41
life.
of
necessities
are
which
heat
as
such
items
It should be noted that the taxing power of government can be
applied to the very businesses with which the state is in competition. The
revenues need not come from the public at large or from activities other
than those with which government competes. Consequently, a city tax of
three percent of gross income applied to a private firm furnishing electric
power to consumers was upheld, even though the city owned and
operated a utility furnishing such power and its utility was not subject to
the tax. 42 In reaching its decision that there was no equal protection
violation in the tax, the Supreme Court reasoned that public and private
enterprises were not equivalent because they possessed different goals:
The private corporation, whatever its public duties, carries on
its business for private profit and is subject to the obligation,
common to all, to contribute to the expense of government by
paying taxes. The municipality, which is enabled to function
40. 253 U.S. at 240.
41. Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917).
42. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934).
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only because it is a tax gatherer, may acquire property or
conduct a business in the interest of the public welfare, and its
gains if any must be used for public ends. Hence equal protection does not require a city to abstain from taxing the business
of a corporation organized for profit merely because in the
public interest the municipality
has acquired like property or
43 conducts a like business.

If government can compete with private enterprise and can tax its
competition, the question arises as to whether the taxing power can be
used to eliminate the private organizations. A government competing for
resources vital to the welfare of its residents may be tempted to increase
taxes to the point where competing private firms are forced to cease
operating. Whether it can do so, however, is not clear. The City of
Pittsburg imposed a twenty percent tax on the gross receipts of private
parking lots, rendering the majority of such lots financially unprofitable,
at the same time that it operated a series of public parking facilities." The
Supreme Court upheld the tax, denying the argument of the parking lot
owners that the tax amounted to a destruction of property without due
process of law. The Court pointed out that the tax raised substantial
revenue, although this was not necessary for its constitutionality; that the
tax simply discouraged the use of automobiles and promoted other forms
of transportation, a goal well within the constitutional power of the city to
pursue; and that the judiciary cannot invalidate a tax "from the fact,
alone, that the tax appears excessive or even so high as to threaten the
existence of an occupation or business." 45 The language suggests that a
tax enacted by a government for the sole and exclusive purpose of
destroying competition from private enterprise may run afoul of the
Constitution. 4
Let us summarize the material to this point. Simply stated, the
principle that emerges is that a state can employ its economic power to
acquire resources and retain them for its residents. It can do so either by
providing subsidies to private enterprise for sales to its residents or by
establishing its own organizations to compete with private firms, and the
financial support for either approach can be obtained through taxation,
43. Id. at 624.
44. City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974).
45. Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
46. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell appears to stress this point: "It is
conceivable. . . that punitive taxation of a private industry and direct economic competition through a governmental entity enjoying special competitive advantages would effectively expropriate a private business for public profit," requiring the payment of compensation or an injunction against the tax. Id. at 379.
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even taxation confined to the state's competitors. However, it should be
noted that these efforts by a state involve economic power, have a
positive tone in that the state is seeking to promote the public welfare by
entering the market rather than by regulating the behavior of individuals
and organizations, and are directed within its boundaries. Are there other
means by which a state can retain resources for its residents-means that
are not economic in nature, that are negative in tone in attempting to
prohibit private parties from acting so as to deprive state residents of
resources, and/or that are directed outside the state, i.e., against organizations and individuals which are not residents?
EXCLUSION OF NONRESIDENTS FROM USE OF STATE RESOURCES

A number of cases have involved a ban on the utilization of marine
resources within a state by nonresidents or the imposition of a fee for a
fishing license where the fee was considerably higher for nonresidents
than for residents. The cases have primarily been decided under the
privileges and immunities clause.
In a leading case interpreting the clause, South Carolina required the
payment of a fee for a license to engage in commercial shrimp fishing in
a three-mile belt extending off the coast of the state. The fee was $25 for
a shrimp boat owned by a resident of South Carolina and $2500 for a boat
owned by a nonresident; the fee paid by a nonresident was thus one
hundred times larger than that paid by a resident. In assessing the
constitutionality of the discrepancy, the Supreme Court in Toomer v.
Witsel 47 stated that the purpose of the privileges and immunities clause
was to guarantee that the privileges possessed by the citizens of one
state-including the privilege of conducting business-will be conferred
upon a citizen of a second state who enters the first state unless there exist
reasons for discrimination against noncitizens which are independent of
and not contingent upon merely the fact that they are not citizens. The
purpose of the clause "is to outlaw classifications based on the fact of
non-citizenship unless there is something to indicate that non-citizens
constitute a peculiar source of evil at which the statute is aimed.'"4
Examining the South Carolina license fees, the Court found nothing
to suggest that non-citizens were more of a threat than citizens to
conservation of shrimp supplies, the alleged purpose of the statute authorizing the fees. Even if they were a greater threat, the state was able to
deal with the situation in ways other than a classification by citizenship;
47. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
48. Id. at 398.
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for example, the state could restrict the type of fishing equipment used or
charge fees the amount of which varied with the size of the boat.
Accordingly, the Court concluded, the discrimination against non-citizens by South Carolina violated the privileges and immunities clause.4 9

In reaching its conclusion in Toomer, the Court recognized the
presence of two important facts which distinguished the case from its
1877 decision in McCready v. Virginia 50° The first was that the fees
were applicable to the pursuit of a free-swimming fish that migrated
through the waters of several states; the second was that the fishing
occurred not inland waters but at sea.5 As a result, the resource to which

South Carolina wished to limit access by nonresidents was not one over
which the state had total and permanent control. McCready differed in
this respect. There, Virginia prohibited the citizens of other states from
planting oysters in the bottom of a designated river but gave the privilege
to Virginia citizens. Since the state owned the river and its bottom, the
Court upheld the statute, saying that the privileges and immunities clause
did not require that the state open to nonresidents the land which it owns,
whether watercovered or not, and the resources found on or under such
49. It is instructive to note that the license fees had also been attacked under the equal
protection clause. The Court did not deal with this clause, but its language in striking the
fees under the privileges and immunities clause could well have been written for equal
protection:
We would be closing our eyes to reality, we believe, if we concluded that there
was a reasonablerelationshipbetween the danger represented by non-citizens, as
a class, and the severe discrimination practiced upon them.
Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
And since we have previously concluded that the reasons advanced in support of
the statute do not bear a reasonablerelationshipto the high degree of discrimination practiced upon citizens of other States, it follows that [the statute authorizing
the difference in license fees] violates Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution.
Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
In discussing the subsidy for automobile hulks under the equal protection clause, the
Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), upheld the
different treatment of resident and nonresident scrap processors because the difference
"bears a rationalrelationshipto Maryland's purpose of using its limited funds to clean up
its own environment, and that is all the Constitution requires." Id. at 814 (emphasis
added).
The Court appears, therefore, to utilize the same test under the privileges and
immunities clause as it does under the equal protection clause when a classification by
residence is at issue. The test is whether there is a rational link between the classification
and the purpose of the statute creating the classification. If the classification is reasonable
in light of the end which it seeks to achieve, there is no violation of either constitutional
provision.
It should be kept in mind that an artificial entity such as a corporation cannot claim
the protection of the privileges and immunities clause, which is limited to "citizens." An
artificial entity, however, is a "person" within the meaning of the equal protection (and
due process) clause. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
50. 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
51. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 401 (1948).
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land. That which is owned in common52 by the people need not be made
available to those who do not own it.
In his concurring opinion in Toomer, Justice Frankfurter took exception to the majority's reliance on the privileges and immunities
clause, feeling that the decision was based on a disruption of interstate
commerce and that the commerce clause prohibiting the states from
regulating such commerce was therefore the appropriate ground for
finding a constitutional violation. 53 The point is well-taken, for South
Carolina was attempting to exclude nonresidents from access to fish that
regularly moved along the coast of several states. However, whether one
follows the majority in Toomer and distinguishes land-based resources
owned by the public, or whether one accepts the view that the commerce
clause is the correct constitutional basis of Toomer, Justice Frankfurter
appears to be on solid ground when he says that the privileges and
immunities clause, as interpreted by McCready and other cases,
does not touch the right of a State to conserve or utilize its
resources on behalf of its own citizens, provided it uses these
resources within the State and does not attempt a control of the
resources as part of a regulation of commerce between the
States. A State may care for its own in utilizing the bounties of
nature within her borders because it has technical ownership of
such bounties or, when ownership is in no one, because the
State may for the common good exercise all the authority that
technical ownership ordinarily confers.'
Following this principle, the Supreme Court of Maine recently
upheld a state statute which authorized municipalities to discriminate
between residents and nonresidents, even to the point of excluding the
latter, in regulating the taking of shellfish from coastal areas within their
On the basis of these facts, Toomer was relied upon to invalidate an Alaskan statute
which authorized the state to halt salmon fishing off the coast by nonresident commercial
fishermen whenever the quantity of salmon caught by residents was expected to be
insufficient for the latter to maintain a reasonable standard of living. Brown v. Anderson,
202 F. Supp. 96 (D. Alas. 1962).
52. 94 U.S. at 396-97.
53. 334 U.S. at 407-09.
54. Id. at 408 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (discussed infra); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (the
ownership of wild game by the state and the police power of the state are sufficient
constitutional grounds for upholding a statute which prohibits the killing in the state of
wild game birds or the possession of killed birds for the purpose of transporting them to
other states); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (Geogia statute providing that only
residents can obtain abortions is unconstitutional under privileges and immunities clause,
since "[i]t is not based on any policy of preserving state-supported facilities for Georgia
residents" and "[t]here is no intimation, either, that Georgia facilities are utilized to
capacity in caring for Georgia residents.")
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jurisdiction.55 While striking down the ordinance excluding nonresidents
adopted by one municipality because of a lack of evidence that the
ordinance was reasonably necessary in the situation, the court held that
the enabling statute was valid under McCready because title to the
shellfish was in the state and because there was a proper governmental
purpose in protecting shellfish, to which purpose the discrimination
against nonresidents bore a substantial relationship.
In sum, it appears that a state can utilize the resources which it owns
for supplying the needs of its residents and that nonresidents have no
constitutional right to those resources. A state can purchase mines and oil
fields and prohibit distribution of the output to nonresidents, at least
where there would be an inadequate supply for residents in the absence of
such state efforts. 6
EXPORT LIMITATIONS ON PRIVATELY-OWNED ITEMS

May a state retain for its residents only those resources to which it
can make some claim of ownership? Or may a state go beyond such
resources to those already in private hands and require that businesses
within its jurisdiction not transport out of state materials in short supply
or at least that they give preference to residents in selling such materials?
There is language in a 1908 decision of the Supreme Court which
lends support to the view that a state can indeed reach items owned by a
private party and restrict their sale to within its boundaries. In the case,
New Jersey prohibited the diversion of water from any fresh lake or river
in the state for delivery to any other state.57 The New Jersey courts
upheld the statute on the ground that the state possessed a degree of
ownership in the water and that those with a right to take the water could
divert it for only a reasonable distance. The Supreme Court affirmed but
pointed out that, without revising the basis of the judgment of the state
courts, it rested its decision on a premise that was broader than and
independent of the ownership by the state of the water.5 8 The premise
was that the state had the constitutional power to retain natural resources
55. State v. Norton, 335 A.2d 607 (Me. 1975).
56. Both McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877), and Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S.
519 (1896), found no interstate commerce to exist, but the test employed for such a
determination has been changed by the Supreme Court, raising the question of whether a
commerce clause violation might be found today in similar situations. See text accompanying notes 86-90 infra. However, a commerce clause violation in Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928), did not keep the Court from indicating that a
state can retain its resources for its residents. See text accompanying notes 63-66 infra.
57. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
58. Id. at 355.
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found within its borders for its own citizens and that it could exercise the
power without showing any justification, including the degree to which
the resources were needed for current or future consumption by its
citizens. The Court appeared to be suggesting that, even after a natural
resource is under private control, the state can dictate its ultimate destination.
The suggestion that resources in private hands can be restricted to
in-state uses was, however, not fully accepted in later decisions by the
Court. In 1966, the Court in City of Altus, Oklahoma v. Carr59 limited
the broad premise in its 1908 opinion by affirming the decision of a threejudge federal district court which held unconstitutional a Texas statute
prohibiting the withdrawal of underground water for transportation to and
use in another state. Since Texas law gave landowners the right to extract
and sell underground water, the statute was found to violate the
commerce clause by restricting interstate commerce after the water had
come under the ownership of private parties.
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court had been the foundation
for the decision of the district court. The first involved an Oklahoma
statute which prohibited domestic corporations, organized for the purpose of transporting natural gas, from sending the gas outside the state
and which precluded any foreign corporation, organized for the same
purpose, from conducting business in the state. 6° An attempt was made to
justify the statute on the grounds that the only sources of fuel within the
state were coal, oil and natural gas; that domestically-produced oil was
already being shipped out of the state while domestic coal was rapidly
escalating in price; and thus that natural gas was the only practical source
of fuel for residents of the state, many of whom did not yet even have
access to it. The Court, however, held that the statute discriminated
against interstate commerce and accordingly violated the commerce
clause. The Court emphasized that the gas sought to be controlled by the
state was privately owned and that private parties have the right to send
the gas in interstate commerce if they choose to do so: "Gas, when
reduced to possession, is a commodity; it belongs to the owner of the
land, and, when reduced to possession, is his individual property subject
to sale by him, and may be a subject of intrastate commerce and interstate
commerce."61

The second case revolved around a West Virginia statute that was
59. 385 U.S. 35, aff'g per curiam, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
60. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
61. Id. at 255.
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enacted because the production of natural gas within the state was
insufficient to supply demand. The statute required that suppliers provide
gas to customers in the state before providing gas to customers in other
states and that suppliers with a gas surplus transfer the excess to suppliers
with a deficiency.6 2 The state defended the statute with the arguments
that suppliers of gas are engaged in a quasi-public business, making it
reasonable to impose a requirement that preference be given to in-state
needs, and that gas produced within the state constitutes a natural resource which the state has the authority to regulate in the interest of its
citizens. The first argument was rejected by the Supreme Court because
there had long been interstate commerce in gas produced in West Virginia prior to the statute, partly as the result of efforts of the state itself.
The second argument was rejected because the gas to be controlled by the
statute was already privately owned. Consequently, said the Court, the
statute could not stand under the commerce clause.
In spite of these cases, however, the Supreme Court has not necessarily sanctioned the blanket premise that a state can never retain resources once they have reached private ownership. In Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel,63 the Court faced a challenge to a Lousiana
"Shrimp Act" which declared shrimp in state waters to be the property
of the state, granted the right to take and process shrimp to residents and
organizations operating processing facilities within the state, and prohibited the exportation of shrimp from which the heads and hulls had not
been removed. Shrimp processing facilities were at the time concentrated
in Mississippi, and the silent purpose of the Act was seen by the Court to
be the development of such facilities in the state. 64 This, said the Court,
was not permissible under the commerce clause:
The State does not require any part of the shrimp to be retained
for consumption or use therein. .

.

. Consistently with the Act

all may be, and in fact nearly all is, caught for transportation
and sale in interstate commerce. As to such shrimp the protection of the commerce clause attaches at the time of the taking. .

.

. As the representative of its people, the State might

have retainedthe shrimpfor consumption and use therein. But,
in direct opposition to conservation for intrastate use, this
enactment permits all parts of the shrimp to be shipped and sold
outside the State. The purpose is not to retain the shrimpfor the
use of the people of Louisiana; .

. .

. [B]y permitting its

62. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
63. 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
64. Id. at 10.
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shrimp to be taken and all the products thereof to be shipped
and sold in interstate commerce, the State necessarily releases
its hold 6and,
as to the shrimp so taken, definitely terminates its
5
control.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished an earlier decision in which it had upheld a Connecticut statute which prohibited killing
wild game birds in the state or possessing killed birds when the birds
were to be sent to other states. 66 The decision was based on the fact that
the state possessed title to or at least the power of control over game and
fish within its borders. This, of course, was true of the shrimp in
Louisiana, but Louisiana was attempting to impose a prerequisite to
interstate commerce not for the purpose of retaining the shrimp for
domestic consumption but only for the purpose of processing, following
which the shrimp were free to move in interstate commerce. Consequently, the correct interpretation of Foster-FountainPacking Co. appears to
be that, if the state owns or controls a resource, it may require private
parties given access to it to confine its distribution within the state for the
purpose of consumption by state residents but not for the limited purpose
of promoting its processing. The restriction on exportation must be an
all-or-none proposition; it cannot be limited only to the point where the
resource is processed into a finished product but must extend to the
ultimate consumption of the resource.
This interpretation is consistent with City of Altus discussed earlier
in this section.67 The total prohibition on the exportation of underground
water in that case was voided because Texas law had previously given
landowners the right to appropriate and sell the water to whomever they
wished, a right that was part of their interest in the land. The statute
enacted by the legislature was therefore attempting to withdraw the right
to utilize that which the landowner already owned; it was not attempting
to regulate the distribution of that which the state owned and to which the
state had granted private parties a right of access and use.
This interpretation is also consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond.6" There, a corporation
purchased raw milk from New York producers and transported it to
Massachusetts for processing and sale. The corporation operated three
receiving depots in New York under license from the state, but it was
denied a license for a fourth depot on the grounds that excessive competi65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 12, 13 (emphasis added).
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
See text accompanying note 59 supra.
336 U.S. 525 (1949).
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tion and an inadequate supply of milk for residents would result. The
Court held that the statute authorizing the license denial was invalid
under the commerce clause because, while the production and distribution of milk is important to and may be regulated to promote the public
health, the open purpose and inevitable effect of the statute was the
curtailment of interstate commerce. Although the Court did not call
attention to the fact, it is important to note that the resource involved
(i.e., milk) was privately-owned and that the state had never possessed
title to it.
In short, a state may purchase a natural resource such as a mineral
deposit (if it is not already on publicly-owned lands) and sell a right of
access to and use of it to private enterprise. At the time of the sale, it
appears capable of requiring that the resource be re-sold only within the
state for consumption by residents of the state. Though such a condition
may restrict the volume of interstate commerce, it does not appear to be a
violation of the commerce clause itself.
FEDERAL CONTROL OVER STATE EXPORT LIMITATIONS

We have seen that a state may curb exports of minerals found within
its jurisdiction in a number of ways. To synthesize the principles thus far
developed, it appears that a state may act: 1) By providing financial
subsidies to private enterprise for the sale of minerals to residents; and 2)
By acquiring ownership of the minerals, even to the extent of a monopoly, and making them available only to residents for processing (if necessary) and consumption.
In identifying these possibilities, we have been concerned with
situations where there has been no action by Congress attempting to
intervene in the state effort to limit exports. Let us now examine the
question of whether the Constitution grants the federal government the
authority to override the means a state might employ to retain resources
for its residents.
There is little reason to doubt that Congress can condition federal
aid on an agreement by states not to discriminate against nonresidents
through a subsidy to private firms or through the sale of publicly-owned
resources, and that federal monies can be withheld from a state failing to
enter or breaking such an agreement. 69 However, the more difficult issue
69. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974); Oklahoma v. United States Civil
Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,
301 U.S. 495, 525-26 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-94, 597-98
(1937); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482-83 (1923).
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is whether Congress can impose a statutory ban on discrimination against
nonresidents. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,70 the Court expressly reserved judgment on whether Congress, acting under the authority of
the commerce clause, could prohibit subsidies favoring residents. 71 The
dissent, however, suggested that there is a logical inconsistency between
such a prohibition and the conclusion of the majority that a state subsidy
was not the type of action with which the commerce clause was concerned.72 Moreover, the action by the Court in NationalLeague of Cities v.
Usery73 in voiding a federal statute establishing minimum wages and
maximum working hours for employees of states on the ground that such
a statute was not within the authority committed to Congress by the
commerce clause, led three dissenting justices to suggest that stateowned business operations may thus be outside the ability of Congress to
regulate under the clause and an exception to the power of the federal
government to control interstate commerce.74 Nonetheless, as the following analysis suggests, a federal ban on discrimination against nonresidents by states is likely to be upheld.
To understand what Congress can do, it is perhaps best to discuss
first what Congress cannot do. Specifically, Congress cannot impose a
duty on a state to engage in a specified conduct in areas of traditional
governmental activity; that is, affirmative action of a designated type
cannot be mandated for state officers by federal legislation when dealing
with functions for which state governments were created and which they
have historically served. Thus, the Court has held unenforceable the
requirement of the Constitution 75 and a federal statute76 that a state
extradite a resident charged with a crime in another state on the demand
of the latter: "liT]he Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no
power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and
compel him to perform it. ' ' 77 The same principle was followed and
elaborated on in National League of Cities, the Court holding that the
commerce clause did not give Congress the authority to specify minimum
70. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
71. Id. at 810 n.19.
72. Id. at 822 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
74. Id. at 872-73 (Brennan, J., with whom White, J., and Marshall, J., join dissenting).
75. U.S. CONsT. art. IV § 2 provides in pertinent part:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall
flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to
the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
76. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, §§ 1,2.
77. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1860).
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wages and maximum working hours for state employees and thereby
displace the ability of states to structure their internal operations in all
areas, including those which are traditional governmental functions:
"Congress may not exercise [its power to regulate interstate commerce]
so as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential
decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to
7
be made."
The principle that the federal government cannot require a state to
pursue certain conduct when traditional governmental functions are involved would have been more thoroughly delineated if the Supreme
Court had not recently vacated several companion cases in which the
Environmental Protection Agency had attempted to compel states to
implement Agency programs to reduce air pollution, the implementation
process including the development of regulations and the enactment of
statutes by the states. 79 The cases were remanded to determine whether
they were moot after the Agency decided to remove the requirement that
regulations and statutes be adopted. It is instructive, nevertheless, to
consider the opinions of the three courts of appeals whose decisions were
vacated.8 0 Each court upheld the authority of the Agency under the
commerce clause to regulate directly all sources of air pollution, whether
the sources were owned by private parties or by the state, but each
suggested that a requirement placed on a state to adopt statutes or
regulations was invalid either because it was outside the power given the
federal government in the commerce clause, because it ran afoul of
article IV, § 4 of the Constitution guaranteeing a republican form of
government to every state, and/or because it violated the tenth amendment reserving to the states all powers not delegated to the federal
government or prohibited by the Constitution. 8 ' In a separate case, the
Third Circuit, while agreeing that the federal government can regulate
public as well as private sources of air pollution, held that the commerce
clause provided the necessary authority to compel a state to adopt
regulations and enforce a federally-created program.8 2 However, the
78. 426 U.S. at 855.
79. Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown, 97 S.Ct. 1635 (1977).
80. Maryland v. Environmental Protection Agency, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded to determine mootness, 97 S.Ct. 1635 (1977); District of Columbia
v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded to determine mootness, 97
S.Ct. 1635 (1977); Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded to determine mootness, 97 S.Ct. 1635 (1977).
81. Maryland v. Environmental Protection Agency, 530 F.2d 215, 225-26 (4th Cir.
1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 987-94 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827, 837-42 (9th Cir. 1975).
82. Pennsylvania v. Environmental Protection Agency, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974).
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continued viability of this case is questionable, since it was based on a
decision which was overruled in National League of Cities.
How, then, will the courts react to a federal statute overriding state
laws and regulations which compel the retention for residents of publiclyowned minerals or which subsidize the retention of privately-owned
minerals? If the federal government attempted to coerce a state into
rescinding such laws and regulations, the situation would not seem to be
significantly different from that faced by states required to adopt laws
and regulations, since state officers would be forced to engage in designated forms of conduct in an area (legislation and regulations) which is
clearly a traditional governmental function. However, there is an important distinction between forcing a state to act to rescind laws and
regulations and forcing it to discontinue certain actions. A federal ban on
continuing to discriminate against nonresidents would be in the latter
category inasmuch as it would simply require that a state cease and desist
from efforts in which it was then engaged. Although the Supreme Court
did not expressly employ this reasoning, the vice of the federal statute in
NationalLeague of Cities appears to be that Congress was attempting to
require state officers to increase wages and decrease working hours for
employees and thus perform an affirmative act affecting the delivery of
services in areas such as fire and police protection which are traditional
governmental functions; Congress was not simply imposing a prohibition
against certain conduct by a state. Congressional enactments which are
strictly prohibitions can be sustained. In an earlier decision, the Court
stopped the State of Illinois from continuing to divert excessive amounts
of water from Lake Michigan. The diversion was affecting the water
level of the lake, reducing its navigable capacity, and was enjoined on
the basis of a federal statute and the commerce clause. s3
A state which discriminates against nonresidents in efforts to retain
minerals, moreover, may not be engaged in a traditional governmental
function. Such efforts would appear to constitute a proprietary function
in that they are directed toward providing a private benefit to citizens
rather than regulating their conduct. s4 In this situation, there is a basis
for believing that Congress can require even affirmative conduct by state
83. Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
In forcing a state to cease certain conduct, it appears to be irrelevant whether a
traditional governmental function is involved. In SanitaryDistrict, the state was enjoined
from diverting water even though it was pursuing a typical governmental function, the
elimination of sewage and the promotion of the public health. NationalLeague of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851, specifies sanitation and public health as a traditional governmental service.
84. See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra.
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officers to conform to federal mandates. For example, where a state
owned and operated a railroad involved in interstate commerce, the Court
unanimously concluded that the state must abide by a federal statute
requiring the use of certain equipment. 85 National League of Cities
expressly re-affirmed the holding on the ground that the state was not
pursuing an activity which constituted a traditional governmental func6
tion.1
A federal statute banning discrimination against nonresidents in the
sale of minerals can be justified under the fourteenth amendment and
under the commerce clause. With regard to the fourteenth amendment,
its privileges and immunities clause or its equal protection clause may be
the basis for invalidating a classification by residence, 87 and its provision
giving Congress the authority to enforce the amendment by appropriate
legislation is likely to supply an adequate constitutional foundation for
the statute inasmuch as the statute can reasonably be expected to
minimize economic conflict between states. This appears to be true even
if state attempts to retain minerals are held to be a traditional governmental function and outside the authority of Congress to regulate under the
commerce clause. 88
The prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment are directed to
the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power.
It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to
enforce against State action, however put forth, whether that
action be executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement
is no invasion of State sovereignty. No law can be, which the
people of the States have, by the Constitution of the United
States, empowered Congress to enact.89
85. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377
U.S. 184 (1964); Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. N. Carolina Ports Auth., 511 F.2d 1007
(4th Cir. 1975), aff'g 370 F. Supp. 33 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
86. 426 U.S. at 854 n.18.
87. The privileges and immunities clause specifies that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Even in the absence of federal legislation, the
clause prohibits a state from forbidding the sale of goods produced by nonresidents unless
the same goods produced by residents are also banned. Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 430,
437 (1936). This suggests that the clause will not permit a state to exclude nonresidents
from the purchase of goods.
88. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172, 174
(7th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977); Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hospital, 428 F. Supp.
1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97
S.Ct. 2959 (1977); Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F.Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976); Usery v.
Dallas Independent School Dist., 421 F. Supp. Il1 (N.D. Texas 1976).
89. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880) (quoted in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 454 (1976)).
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The statute, however, can also be justified under the commerce
clause. To utilize the clause, interstate commerce must be involved, and
an affirmative answer would appear inevitable to the question of
whether, by acting to retain minerals produced within its jurisdiction, a
state is discriminating against and burdening interstate commerce. In one
case already discussed, a Virginia prohibition against the planting of
oysters in a river by nonresidents was held not to involve interstate
commerce because there was an effect only on cultivation and production, not on transportation or sale. 90 In another case mentioned earlier, a
state prohibition on killing wild game birds or the possession of killed
birds in order to transport them to other states was held by the Court not
to involve interstate commerce because the prohibition kept the birds
from becoming part of such commerce and thus concerned only the
internal commerce of the state. 91 However, these decisions utilized
reasoning which is unlikely to be followed. The test of interstate
commerce today is not dependent upon the application of labels such as
"production, .... transportation," "internal," or "local"; the test is
whether the activity in question has an effect on interstate commerce:
"Even activity which is purely intrastate in character may be regulated
by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others
similarly situated, affects commerce among the states or with foreign
nations.'"92

A 1942 case decided by the Supreme Court illustrates the reach of
the commerce clause and suggests the clause would provide Congress
with the authority to ban discrimination against nonresidents by states
seeking to retain domestically produced minerals. At issue in the case
was a federal statute establishing quotas for the amount of wheat grown
by individual farmers. 93 The Court upheld its application to a farmer who
exceeded his quota, concluding that the excess produced, though it might
be consumed on the premises, could seriously damage interstate
commerce in wheat. By producing only for his own needs, the individual
reduced the amount of wheat that would otherwise flow in interstate
commerce, and although the effect on commerce of any one individual
was insignificant, there would be a substantial impact from the combined
actions of all individuals behaving similarly. Accordingly, the Court
90. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
91. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
92. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
The ability of Congress to pre-empt state activity affecting interstate commerce may
be greater than the authority of the courts to void state activity under the commerce
clause. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 1740, 1750 n.17 (1977).
93. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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reasoned, the commerce clause permitted Congress to regulate the
amount of wheat grown. If prohibiting excess production is justified
because interstate commerce is affected, prohibiting states from banning
or discouraging sales to nonresidents would also seem justified, for
interstate commerce would unquestionably be affected by the exercise of
such state power. In the words of the Supreme Court:
If the States have such power a singular situation might result.
Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the
mining States their minerals. And why may not the products of
the field be brought within the principle? [The] . . . influence
on interstate commerce need not be pointed out. . . . If one

State has [such power], all States have it; embargo may be
retaliated by embargo, and commerce will be halted at state
lines. .

.

. [Avoiding such a situation] was the purpose, as it is

the result, of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. 94
By way of conclusion, an attempt may be made to use the commerce
clause to justify a federal statute of the type under consideration here as
an emergency measure. State attempts to limit the exportation of their
raw materials will be a response to inadequate supplies of raw materials
and will quickly jeopardize the ability of the economy to produce sufficient goods and provide sufficient employment. A similar threat from
inadequate energy supplies led Congress in 1973 to adopt the Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act 95 which required the President to impose mandatory measures to allocate petroleum and which expressly pre-empted
any conflicting allocation program established by a State. The Act has
been upheld under the commerce clause, 96 and challenges to it under
other constitutional provisions have also been rejected. 97 However, since
all of these decisions emanated from lower federal courts, an examination is necessary of the criteria imposed by the Supreme Court for
validating emergency measures under the commerce clause.
NationalLeague of Cities distinguished, but re-affirmed an earlier
94. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911); cf. Great Ati. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
95. Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 628 (as amended; codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-756
(Supp. V 1975)).
96. Fuel Merchants Ass'n v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1974).
97. Cities Service Co. v. Federal Energy Admin., 529 F.2d 1016 (Emer. Ct. App.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976); Condor Operating Co. v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 351
(Emer. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); United States v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
408 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Admin., 391 F. Supp.
856 (W.D. Pa. 1975), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 521 F.2d 810 (Emer. Ct. App.

1975).
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decision 98 holding that legislation authorizing the federal government to
place limits on wages and salaries was valid under the commerce clause
as applied to state and local governments. In discussing the prior decision, the Supreme Court stressed that the legislation there was an
emergency measure to combat severe inflation and that it was acceptable
because: 1) It was to be in effect only for a "very limited, specific period
of time.' '99 2) It did not affect the structure, i.e., manner of delivery, of
act affirmatively to restrucgovernmental operations or require states to
1
ture those operations in a designated way. 00
Though it is the latest statement of the Court on the subject, this test
for emergency legislation under the commerce clause is not useful for
determining the constitutionality of a statute. The second criterion simply
reiterates the general test articulated in National League of Cities for
legislation affecting states enacted under the commerce clause. The first
criterion is superfluous in a constitutional examination, for if the second
criterion is satisfied, the length of time the legislation is in effect will not
determine its constitutionality, only whether it is labelled an "emergency" measure. Moreover, since the shortages of minerals likely to exist in
the future will be permanent, inasmuch as minerals are nonrenewable in
nature and finite in amount, the statute will not be capable of being a
temporary, emergency measure. Therefore, the question concerning federal legislation dealing with state export limitations will not be its
emergency character, but whether it imposes a duty of affirmative action
on states in an area of a traditional governmental function.
CONCLUSION

If this country is to continue to be the United States, the federal
government cannot permit states to retain their minerals. If Congress
does not utilize its authority under the Constitution to suppress state
action directed to this end, the result will be internal economic warfare.
"The Constitution," in the words of Mr. Justice Cordozo, "was framed
upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union
and not division." 101
However, as this country moves into an era of resource scarcity,
98. 426 U.S. at 852-53 (distinguishing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975)).
99. 426 U.S. at 853.
The temporary nature of an emergency measure was also stressed in Home Building
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 441, 447 (1934), and in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135, 157 (1921).
100. Id.
101. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
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Congress may not want to place a complete ban on state efforts to retain
minerals. A total ban would permit the economic forces of the market to
determine distribution, and this may yield results inconsistent with the
public welfare. Accordingly, the most effective approach may be a
federal agency to supervise distribution, allowing states to retain minerals where appropriate and overruling them where necessary.
If there is to be a federal agency, the question arises as to the criteria
it will employ in determining distribution. Given an inadequate supply of
a mineral, how should it be divided among those needing it? One
criterion which should be employed in making this determination is the
sociological impact that would result from the alternative courses of
action that might be followed.
Sociology is a relatively young science, and concern among
sociologists with environmental and resource issues is even more recent;
indeed, a Section on Environmental Sociology was created by the American Sociological Association only in 1976.12 As a result, the sociological dimensions to be examined in a decision affecting resource distribution
are not yet clearly established. 10 3 However, the perceptive analyses of
sociologist William Catton suggest the directions that might be followed
in identifying the sociological consequences of decisions on resource
distribution. Catton proceeds on the premise that the environmental
sociologist accepts the framework of the branch of biology known as
ecology, including its assumption that the human species is but one part
of an interdependent, interacting system of living organisms on the planet
and that the resources of the planet are finite, placing limits on economic
growth and social phenomena.' 0 4 Those limits are believed to have been
exceeded by current population numbers, however, 0 5 and the result
expected is that which ensues when overpopulation occurs in other living
organisms-a substantial and uncontrollable reduction in the size of the
population. Since it is the social implications of this prospect with which
environmental sociologists should be concerned, Catton suggests the
following specific foci:
102. ENVT'L Soc., No. 9, Oct. 1976, at 2.
103. Sociological variables are rarely considered, let alone quantified, in environmental
impact statements required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Friesma &
Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, and the EnvironmentalImpact Statement Process, 16
NAT. RESOURCES J. 339 (1976); Flynn, Science and Speculationin Social Impact Assessment, in Soc. IMPACT ASSESSMENT 5 (Nov.-Dec. 1976).
104. Catton, Memorandum: Difference Between EnvironmentalSociology and Human
Ecology, ENVT'L Soc., No. 8, Dec. 1975, at 9.
105. As Catton phrases it, "[b]y the time a substantial number of people began to
worry out loud about what to do 'if' the world 'eventually' were to become overpopulated,
it already was." Catton, Depending on Ghosts, 2 HUMBOLDT J. Soc. REL. 45 (1974).
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1. The stresses likely to be added to or eliminated from the
structure of social institutions, such as government, which
(structure) developed in an era of material abundance.
2. The types of collective behavior (for example, rumoring
and rioting) which are probable results of the destruction of
established and expected behavior patterns whose existence was dependent upon material abundance.
3. The short- and long-term effects on the attitudes of the
public of a resource allocation decision, including the
extent to which the decision may reinforce or reduce the
belief in the limitlessness of economic expansion and the
acceptance of new social structures that are consistent with
resource scarcity and reduced population numbers. 6
Whether or not one accepts the pessimistic outlook of the Catton
position, the sociological dimension needs to be considered in resource
allocation decisions. The dimension is important because sociological
factors can alternatively exacerbate or reduce already-existing shortages.
Regrettably, the predictive utility of sociological information is less than
one might desire, but at the very least the information will sensitize the
decisionmaker to important aspects of the allocation problem and provide
the basis for educated guesses that should be more effective than decisions based on speculation.
106. Catton, NEPA, Sociologists and Succession:A PositionPaper,ENVT'L Soc., No.
5, Jan. 1975, at 8, 18-19.
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